What You Can Do

This is a Memorandum that is circulating the UFO community. Below the Memorandum are form letters to send to Congress (Scroll to the Bottom). Remember, Congress is full of old people like me. They like letters, not email. Make your voice heard. To find your Congressional Representative: https://www.house.gov/representatives/find-your-representative

To: The UFO Community

  Senate Bill No. 3905 (Report about Coordination of Efforts under the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon Task Force)

This memorandum analyzes the language attached to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (“Act”) asking for a Report about policies for the coordination of the study of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon (“UAP”), formerly UFOs.[1]    While the Act is the first publicly known legislative effort to study recent sightings, it raises many more questions than it answers.  Based on past experience and the tenor of its language, the direction of the request is reasonable in the short-term but raises long-term concerns.  We must be concerned about defense/intelligence driven assumptions of hostility.  If “hostility” is the main driver of this legislative effort, there will be little information the Senate Intelligence Committee will share with the public.  When we look at relevant historical precedents, advocates of government disclosure of the UAP/UFO phenomenon need to help our elected officials.  Without the knowledge that we possess, it is unlikely the Committee will chart a long-term course of action that includes substantially less secrecy and more participation by the American people.  The past history of government UFO secrecy makes it reasonable to question the sincerity of the Defense and Intelligence communities without proper safeguards in place that protect our rights to a free and open government.            

Legal Enforceability of the UAP Report

First, the UAP discussion is not contained in the Act itself.  It is discussed in the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s “Committee Comments”.  These comments are not part of the actual language of the Act.[2]  The distinction between a standalone Committee Comment and the Act’s actual legislative language means that the actions requested will not have the force of law.  While there are requests for Reports on other subjects that will become law if the budget authorization Act passes, the UAP language is an uncodified request to the Defense and Intelligence communities.[3]  The failure to respond will not have legal sanctions.  However, the mere fact that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence publicly asked for it means that the subject has taken on a greater level of importance. 

There are reasons to pursue a non-legally binding request.  The language was added on June 8th by the Acting Chair Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.).  The Senate record shows that the “Committee” supports the request for an unclassified report.  The UAP Committee Comments do not show any committee vote.  As a Comment, Senators do not have to put themselves on the record voting for or against this item.  It was likely a consensus approval without a formal vote of Intelligence Committee members.  This is significant since it shows that the request was not a “partisan” issue.  In these hyper-partisan times, unanimous consent items are rare except for housekeeping-type measures.  If the request had been an amendment to the Act, a recorded vote would be shown in the Congressional Record.  This means that no one, except Sen. Marco Rubio, is “on the record” for their support of the measure.  A downside to this approach is the possibility that no Report will be prepared.  The UAP Committee Comments also speak on behalf of three other committees who will receive the Report.  The Senate and House Armed Services Committees along with the House Select Intelligence Committee will receive copies of the Report and any classified attachment.  If the request had been part of the Bill, each of these committees would have had to approve the request.  This would have required several more hearings during a difficult time to hold hearings.  Sen. Rubio chose an efficient way to proceed, but this path has potential pitfalls.    

By making the request outside of the legislative language, Senator Rubio[4] was able to skip a lot of procedural steps.  However, there is no enforcement mechanism to compel compliance.  Usually, these less formal requests are complied with so the affected agencies can stay in the good graces of the committees that approve their budgets and oversee their operations.  However, it does give the military and intelligence communities the ability to delay and/or ignore the request.  Given the past history of Congressional requests for information about UAP/UFOs, it is something to watch.

Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon Task Force

The earliest press report of the Office of Naval Intelligence Task Force that I have found was a May 22, 2020 article on The Black Vault website.[5]  The Official acknowledgement dates from a statement by Pentagon Spokesperson Susan Gough about the UAP Task Force on May 14, 2020.  While there was a program funded by Congress earlier this century (“Advanced Aerial Threat Identification Program”), this Task Force had not been publicly acknowledged until recently. 

The use of the term “Task Force” is of interest.  In general, a Task Force usually has a much different structure and purpose than a specifically approved program.  Here, the question is whether the Task Force, located in the Office of Naval Intelligence, is a Navy-only body or a larger inter-agency group.  A Task Force is usually a committee that is made up of personnel from various agencies, departments and/or programs that have a common interest in a particular subject.  Normally, a Task Force is set up to look into an issue and pass recommendations back to the member agencies.  The purpose is usually to come up with protocols and foster cooperation between the member agencies.  It seldom has its own budget and relies of resources from the member agencies to accomplish its tasks.  When the purpose of the Task Force is completed, it usually disbands.  Although the federal government has authorized task forces that were intended to have a more permanent existence, the use of the term likely means it is a committee of temporary duration. 

Here, nothing in the legislation or the Committee Comments gives an indication of the permanency of the UAP Task Force or whether it has members from outside the Navy.  It is likely a group put together consisting of various Naval officials who have responsibility over operations that may be impacted by the UAP phenomenon.  There is a possibility that the Task Force has members from outside of the Navy.  The fact that there is a lack of coordination between service branches, likely means that the Navy acted alone in beginning to develop procedures for collection and reporting of data.[6] This delegation, solely to the Navy, gives it authority to come up with guidelines that will be used across the defense and intelligence communities.  However, the various federal agencies are not required to adopt the UAP Task Force recommended policies since the Intelligence Committee’s request will not have the force of law.           

Report Timing and Responsible Agencies

The Committee Comment language requires the Report be submitted to the four congressional armed services and intelligence committees within six months of the adoption of Bill No. 3905.  Since the Bill is for the FY2021, it is supposed to be adopted and signed into law before October 1, 2020, the beginning of the new Fiscal Year.[7]  The Bill has two purposes, (1) to standardize UAP reporting procedures (Office of Naval Intelligence) and (2) to establish information sharing and coordination across agency boundaries (Director of National Intelligence, consulting with the Secretary of Defense).  For the first purpose, standardization includes “collection and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations”.  This request is directed at the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The standardization of UAP reporting, data collection, and analysis is recommended to be accomplished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the current location of the UAP Task Force.  The Senate Select Intelligence Committee “supports” their efforts.  This is a significant statement.  It appears to be the Navy that is leading the effort to identify the UAPs.  By “supporting” their approach, it puts the Senate Intelligence Committee efforts closer to disclosure than any other federal body to date.  If the “suggestion” were to allow the Air Force to develop the protocols, given its past history, the issue might never have seen the light of day.    

Historically, the Navy has been slightly more open about the origins of the UAP/UFO phenomenon than the Air Force or the Intelligence Community.  In January 1953, the Navy, through its photo interpretive laboratory, advised the CIA Robertson Panel that a film taken in Tremonton, Utah showed self-luminous objects traveling without any known propulsion system.  The Panel, Air Force, and CIA all quickly dismissed this film as showing seagulls.  At the time, Arthur Lundahl[8] was the second highest ranking civilian employee in the Navy’s photo lab.  Soon after the Robertson Panel, Lundahl was tasked by the CIA to set up its first photo interpretation laboratory.  After Mr. Lundahl retired from a distinguished career at the CIA, he stated that the Tremonton film showed a genuine UFO.  In some way, history seems to be repeating itself in that the Navy is the first to step forward while the Air Force and CIA continue to cover up public knowledge of the phenomenon.  Support for the Navy’s approach is a positive sign of the leanings of our elected representatives who are members of this key committee.

The second request was to establish protocols for information sharing across jurisdictional boundaries within the Defense and Intelligence communities.  The specific language setting up the process is as follows:

“Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena (also known as ‘‘anomalous aerial vehicles’’), including observed airborne objects that have not been identified.”

The primary responsibility is placed on the DNI (Director of National Intelligence).  The DNI is to “consult” with the Secretary of Defense (“SecDef”).  This consultation should include the heads of other agencies that the DNI and SecDef believe are relevant.  The Director of National Intelligence has coordination authority over the seventeen intelligence agencies.  The DNI was created in post-911 legislation to coordinate the various elements of the Intelligence Community to prevent intelligence failures like the 911 attack.  It seems that giving the DNI primary responsibility for coordination of the UAP/UFO response is appropriate and has precedent.

 The additional consulting agencies will primarily come from the seventeen agencies under the authority of the DNI.  Besides the Navy, the other branches of the Defense Department will likely be included.  With the recent creation of the U.S. Space Force, primarily carved out of the Air Force, this could be the first indication as to whether the new branch will continue the Air Force policies of denial of the phenomenon.  Outside of the Defense and Intelligence Communities, NASA may also be asked to participate.  One other possibility is the FBI, which is specifically mentioned in the Comments.  Inclusion of the FBI would be an interesting development.  Since September 1947, the FBI has consistently maintained that it is not involved with the phenomenon.  Yet, recently declassified records show that the FBI would send agents to UFO meetings, with reports being sent back to then Director J. Edgar Hoover.[9]  The Senate Intelligence Committee’s Committee Comments specifically request that the FBI be consulted for intrusions into restricted U.S. airspace. 

 UAP Report: Required Contents

The Intelligence Committee specifies what it wants included in the Report.  These items are requested using mandatory language (“directed”).  This indicates the specific interests that the Committee wants for a legitimate legislative purpose.  In other words, the type of information intended to help the four congressional committees to craft future legislation.  It lists eight categories of information (See, Appendix).  The first request is a “detailed analysis” of UAP data held by the Office of Naval Intelligence.  This includes information in the possession of the UAP Task Force.  Since the Navy has been on the forefront of recent information, this is a logical first request. 

What is striking about this initial request is the absence of any request for similar information from the Air Force or the newly formed Space Force.  This limitation may signal an attempt to limit information to the three incidents (since 2004) where pilot camera footage has become public.  From 1947 until 1969, the Air Force had a public collection system for UAP/UFO sightings/evidence.  In addition, the Air Force had a separate classified process to collect information about UAP/UFO activity that did not stop in 1969.  Military reports were funneled through this secondary process.  Also, there are informed persons, i.e. Grant Cameron, who have discovered UAP/UFO sighting reports were held by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (“NORAD”) which is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act disclosure requirements.  Without expanded information, the Report to the four congressional committees will only give a partial picture of the information held by the service branches.  It is likely that this limitation was needed to be able to get a Report back within the short, for the federal government, 180 day window.

The direction includes a “detailed analysis” of information obtained by “national technical means” and human intelligence.  This would include satellite, cyber methods, and signals intelligence, along with human intelligence.  The direction is to include “data and intelligence reporting” likely from the military and civilian agencies with the Director of National Intelligence charged with coordinating their efforts.  This would include each military branch’s intelligence arms and civilian agencies such as the Department of Energy-Office of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence. 

An interesting inclusion is a specific request to the FBI.  As discussed above, the FBI has claimed to be out of the UAP/UFO data collection business since September 1947.  Its public archive has very few documents on UFOs and the format is seemingly meant to frustrate researchers with documents linked together with little rhyme or reason.  The FBI is supposed to produce information “derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace.”  General sighting reports are excluded.  Only information about intrusions into restricted airspace are required.  This limitation is curious since it only applies to airspace that is around sensitive facilities, i.e. nuclear power plants, airports, and government buildings.  While this limitation makes sense for a “threat analysis”, it limits the types of reports requested to be supplied by the FBI.  Another possible explanation is that the FBI has been secretly tasked to handle domestic restricted airspace intrusions due to the statutory limitations on the CIA, and other intelligence agencies, that prevent them from domestic law enforcement and intelligence gathering functions.

The Report needs to describe the process for coordination “ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information.”  This requires each agency to follow a process that goes across agency boundaries, both military and civilian.  A responsible official must be designated who is required to coordinate with other agencies.  The Committee has requested this specific information so that it can determine who is responsible for implementing the UAP policies at each agency.  Lack of information and accountability has been a hallmark of the federal response to UAP/UFO issues that has stymied Congress for decades.  Congressional inquiries over the years have had little information about who handles the issues related to the UAP/UFO phenomenon.  This requirement could allow for more accountability in the future. 

The Report to the four congressional committees requires “(i)dentification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries”.  This requirement gets to the heart of the congressional inquiry.  The Report is to identify what threats are posed by UAPs.  The details of the response to this item will likely be classified.  As with any threat to the country, UAP or not, the first step would be for a classified analysis before any public disclosure.  If the threat is attributed to a terrestrial foreign adversary, it is also highly unlikely that it will be discussed in the public portion of the Report. 

The Report requires the Defense and Intelligence communities to discuss “incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put United States strategic or conventional forces at risk”.  This is aimed at terrestrial adversaries who have made a technological leap that puts our military forces at a severe disadvantage.  Any affirmative response to this query will be contained in the classified portion of the Report.  Application of this item to extraterrestrial visitation shows a priori that “they” meet both criteria as (1) a “potential adversary” and (2) that “they” have “achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities”.  Without having achieved a technological breakthrough, they would not be here.  It is unlikely that the response will jump to the conclusion that the alien races are visiting Earth.  To do so would require an explanation as to why the Senate Select Intelligence Committee is just hearing about it.[10]  In addition, such explosive information would not be conveyed so quickly when official policy of the military and intelligence communities for 70 plus years is that all UAP/UFO claims are made by people who are (1) mistaken, (2) hoaxing, or (3) delusional.  At best, the Report, in its classified section, will leave bread crumbs towards this possibility without throwing their own agencies under the collective “bus” for their past conduct. 

Finally, the Intelligence Committee asks for recommendations about ways to study the phenomenon including funding needs.  This final request ties the inquiry to a legislative purpose.  In other words, give us your recommendations of how we can legislate new programs, including costs, to come up with answers to solve this mystery.  The UAP language is asking the entire defense and intelligence establishment to give the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees a legislative roadmap towards figuring this out.  This places those we know have hidden the UAP/UFO phenomenon in charge of how, or if, disclosure will take place.  Thus we are faced with a dilemma.  Can the agencies that have helped cover up this phenomenon be trusted to turn over a new leaf?

What Constitutes a Threat and How It Affects Study of the Problem?

The underlying premise of the Intelligence Committee’s request is that UAPs probably constitute a threat.  Every question in the Committee Comments can be seen through the “threat assessment” lens, be it from Al Qaeda, China, or Zeta Reticuli.  For the Senators on the Committee[11] that requested the Report, this is an entirely reasonable assumption.  The purpose of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees is to help the federal government keep us safe from external threats.  These committees do not oversee research into solving the mysteries of the Universe.  So, we must be concerned about how the assumptions built into the assessment process will drive public policy about one of the most important questions of our time.  Will built-in assumptions that UAP/UFOs are existential threats to humanity benefit the American people or the military-industrial complex?  Based on past history, the Report will be written to protect the classified programs and secrecy.  Will Americans be part of an informed decision making process about extraterrestrial life visiting our planet?  If they are not fully informed, they cannot play a proper role in this constitutional democracy. 

Because of the forum (National Security Public Policy arena) and the subject matter (potential first official recognition of alien visitation), it is reasonable for a government to start with this premise.  However, absent publicly-available information that indicates a threat to public safety exists, there should be a broader, more open approach to this problem.  While the process has reasonably started with the “threat” assumption, certain standards should be advocated to make sure the issue, writ large, is not once again captured by the secrecy behind the cloak of “national security”. 

Absent a publicly demonstrated threat, the public policy review should include diplomatic issues and the broader global implications of contact.   Yet, much of this early process will depend on what constitutes a threat.  A genuine threat should be taken seriously.  Yet, after at least seventy years of constant visitations, a threat finding needs to be based on evidence and not fear being used as an excuse to hide an ET presence.  The Committee Comments do not define the meaning of the term “threat”.  Without further direction from the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, the military/intelligence community will define what constitutes a threat.  This leaves broad discretion in unelected hands.  Essentially, a critical initial decision has been left in the hands of a group that has taken many actions taken over decades that they do not want scrutinized.  By the time the Report is issued, if it ever is issued, the four Congressional Committees will be predisposed to see the UAP/UFO phenomenon through this prism.  To the detriment of the public, the threat angle will help keep matter in a classified setting. 

How the Report addresses the “threat” premise will guide where this process leads.  If the “threat” is requires only proof of the existence of far superior technology to the United States military, one can see headlines that “Secret Defense Department Report finds U.S. under Threat by Unknown Technology: Seeks Funding to Address It”.[12]  Once the phenomenon is seen as primarily a threat, there will be little public acknowledgement of the specifics of how the government is dealing with this “crisis”.  While there is a possibility that some UAP/UFOs are the product of a foreign terrestrial government, the public declaration of an “unknown threat” will likely brand the phenomenon as an ominous “military first” problem.  As a hammer sees everything else as a “nail” to be pounded, the problem will be defined from a position of aggression rather than first trying to understand what we are dealing with. 

However, if the Intelligence Committee can require proof of actual adverse activity instead of mere observation of our facilities, the branding of the “problem” will change from a “threat first” perspective to one that will allow for a more nuanced discussion of the phenomenon.  The four Committees will need help from knowledgeable members of the UFO community to give them accurate background information that will point out flaws in the Report if it shows bias in reporting potential ET threats.  If the military/intelligence community plays up the threat, the Report, in the classified attachment, must have specific examples of UAPs doing more than just invading restricted airspace.  Specific examples should be required to demonstrate an actual threat.  Without specific hostile acts showing evidence of bad intent, non-aggressive intrusions that amount to surveillance of our capabilities should not be considered a hostile intent. 

If the Report attributes these intrusions to terrestrial adversaries, they should be of concern because it is more likely we will be attacked by our own species.  This kind of evidence would show that a hostile power has made a great leap in technology.  Without specific proof, the Report will have problems attributing the threat to a specific terrestrial power.  Doing so would focus attention on that country and may lead to a high profile response from the country we accuse that will have international consequences.  If incorrect, such an accusation would do grave damage to the United States in the international arena.  This possibility of using a foreign power as a scapegoat, without specific evidence, has too many risks for the military/intelligence communities.  However, if these intrusions cannot be attributed to a terrestrial source in the Report, the issue will become much more complicated and likely hidden from the public while we “figure it out”.  If the Report signals a vague allusion to a threat without documented aggressive acts, it will signal a “business as usual” attitude.  The UFO community, using past history, can educate our elected representatives about the 73 years of waiting for the military and intelligence communities to “figure it out” before working with Congress. 

It is important the four committees be educated by knowledgeable people and public organizations to show that the UAP/UFO phenomenon should not be a purely military/intelligence issue.  Given past history, the unknown nature of the phenomenon, with some sort of terrestrial explanation, will be the most likely result of the Report.  It is likely that the terrestrial option will not be discarded.  It will be used as a general “fig leaf” to delay the inevitable disclosure of ET visitation.[13]      

If, according to the Report, nothing else has occurred except the intrusions by non-terrestrial (labeled “Unknown”) sources near military and other sensitive facilities, the Report will have need to explain who “they” are and why “they” are doing it.  If there have been no aggressive actions taken against our restricted areas, it will be more difficult to explain their concern.  If the Report shows the congressional committees that there have been aggressive acts committed by UAPs, the next question will be when did these aggressive acts start.  The length of time these intrusive acts have been occurring will be an important factor for the Committees to determine the seriousness of the threat.  This will raise a dilemma for the agencies who write the Report.  How much do they tell the four Committees at this time?[14]  As discussed below, this dilemma will have to be resolved in a short time window.  While six months from October 2020 sounds like a long time, there will likely be a transition of power taking place with a new Presidential administration installed halfway through the 180 days.[15]  The principal players (DNI and SecDef) will likely be different after January 20, 2021 than they are now.

The Director of National Intelligence and SecDef will have to decide if they want to reach back before 2004 to come up with examples to show a continuing threat.  However, discussing pre-2004 U.S.S. Nimitz cases open up a can of worms that highly classified programs will oppose or resist in this short window before the Report is due.  The definition of what actions constitute a threat could create headaches, made worse by the probable change in administrations.  If none of the UAPs are of terrestrial origin, the most likely possibility is that the military and intelligence communities will make bland statements of concern and request further funding to study the matter.  They will admit to intrusions by vehicles with superior technology from an unknown source and leave it at that for now.  It is likely that the Report would declare UAPs as a potential threat, based on what information can be gleaned from recent information (post-2004).  To take any other tact will lead quickly to inquiries about pre-2004 UAP/UFO activity and a cause the military/intelligence groups involved in covering things up for decades to expose their own past failures.  This short time window requires that the authors of the Report must navigate a mine field if they play up a threat, but not in a way that will invite closer congressional scrutiny.  They do not want to be put in a position that will cause Congress to brand their inaction as an intelligence failure like 911, weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or the fall of the Soviet Union.                      

It is important for the public to demand as many specifics on the type of threat as they can.  Forcing the response by the DNI and SecDef to be specific about the factors behind the “threat” conclusion will educate our elected representatives about the phenomenon.  If there are holes in the Report’s analysis, the UFO community is the best source of knowledge that can educate a Congress that is only being given a slanted view of the phenomenon.  This process will require the public to “educate” Congress on the past history of the phenomenon and the policies pursued by the defense and intelligence communities over the years. 

Historical Background

The June 8, 2020 actions of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee are a hopeful sign.  However, there are concerns that need to be addressed.  Like Charlie Brown in the cartoon Peanuts, the football has been pulled away so many times that expectations must be managed.  The aftermath of the 1952 Flying Saucer Wave led to President Truman to ask the CIA to study the phenomenon.  The Agency, with the help of the Air Force, slow walked a scientific panel until the next presidential administration.  This enabled the new administration to push a narrative that declared people and organizations who study UFOs were the real “threat”.  We have been living this this policy ever since. 

The declaration of a threat led to many steps that limited the study of UFOs.  Before the Agency sent out the results of the Robertson Panel to other federal agencies, the CIA sent an agent to North American Aviation in Southern California to ‘suggest” that a rocket scientist quit Civilian Saucer Investigators (Los Angeles).  At the time, CSI-LA was doing scientific investigations of UFOs with volunteer scientists and engineers that were featured in Life Magazine.  Within a year, the organization closed its doors.  The Air Force followed up with a regulation that caused pilot reports to dry up.  The use of the “threat” was an excuse to clamp down on public study of UFOs that conflicted with the government narrative.

In the 1960s, attempts at congressional investigation of the phenomenon were stopped cold by the military and intelligence communities.  The hoped for “scientific” review of UFOs was dashed when the Condon Committee choose to denigrate significant evidence, while playing up flimsy cases.  Its report was introduced by the New York Times science editor who misrepresented its contents.  The era was filled with anecdotes of elected officials threatened off of the topic of UFOs.

In the 1990s, the Air Force spent $40 million dollars to produce two highly questionable Roswell reports to tamp down public interest.  Every time that the public comes closer to making the UFO phenomenon a serious public policy issue, the military and intelligence communities are able to put a lid on serious review by our elected officials.  Now, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee has restarted the same process. As President Ronald Reagan said about Soviet Union promises, “trust, but verify.”            

Conclusion

The purpose of this Memorandum is inform those in the UFO community about the mechanics of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee’s request for information about what are now officially called UAPs.  Despite press accounts to the contrary, the request does not have the force of law even though its effectiveness is tied to the adoption of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. 

Despite its lack of legal enforceability, the request is a positive step forward.  The Committee Comments request that the Office of Naval Intelligence be the lead agency for developing “standardize collection and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations.”  This step alone takes the matter out of the hands of the Air Force and publicly acknowledges that identification efforts are necessary. 

The request for a Report within 180 days of approval of the annual authorization bill from the broader defense and intelligence communities is another step towards more accountability from our elected officials about this phenomenon.  However, the request is couched in terms of the “threat” that UAPs may have to our national security.  The referral does not list any criteria for a “threat” to be established.  Obviously, if any UAPs are of terrestrial origin, the concern is genuine.  However, the phenomenon did not begin in 2004 with the U.S.S. Nimitz sighting and the short response period may demonstrate that the focus is short-term. 

The history of leaving the defense and intelligence communities with the responsibility to look out for us in relation to Flying Saucers/UFOs/UAPs has not been helpful.  Those who wish to lift the veil of secrecy have been marginalized by our government’s reliance on the unelected few to “protect” us from this “threat”.  If the Intelligence Committee does not define the “threat”, the military/intelligence community will.  It will likely be to our detriment unless we get involved.

It is highly unlikely that members of the Intelligence Committee have more than an average person’s knowledge about the subject.  It is critical that informed members of the public reach out to our elected leaders to help educate them on the broader issues at stake.  This will help them be more critical reviewers of the Defense/Intelligence Agencies’ response to the Senate Committee inquiry. 

If you are interested, I will be preparing form letters for citizens to send to their elected officials to help prepare them to ask the right questions.  My only goal is to limit official secrecy as much as we possibly can so that the American people can participate in this critical public policy issue. 

Thank you for your attention to this matter.      

[1] This name change for the phenomenon is the first official name change since the 1952 change by the Air Force from “Flying Saucer” to “Unidentified Flying Object”.  At that time, the Air Force and CIA referred to the phenomenon in written memoranda as “the problem”.

[2] The UAP language is attached to this Memorandum’s Appendix. 

[3] Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Title V (§§501-513:  Reports and Other Matters).

[4] Senator Rubio is the Senate Intelligence Committee Chair because of the current investigation of insider trading allegations against Richard Burr (R-NC).  Some have speculated that Sen. Rubio plays a similar role to Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev. (ret.)) as to advocacy of UAP/UFO study.  It is highly likely that his temporary appointment gave him the chance to take these steps to formalize the procedures and policies for UAP study by the Defense and Intelligence communities.  The opportunity presented to Sen. Rubio may not have been available if he had tried to pursue a more normal route by adding the UAP language to Bill No. 3905 itself.  Such an action would have delayed the appropriations process.  His actions could be explained by the serendipitous events that led to his placement on the Committee as its temporary chair. 

[5] https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/dod-officially-acknowledges-unidentified-aerial-phenomena-task-force/

[6] https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/23/us-navy-guidelines-reporting-ufos-1375290

[7] While this is an election year where budget approvals are subject to intense partisanship and normal budget bills are seldom timely adopted, the Defense and Intelligence community budget bills are usually carved out from these partisan fights.  However, it is possible that this Bill may never be adopted.  If election year partisan bickering derails this Bill, the budgets for the Defense and Intelligence communities will be funded in an FY2021 Omnibus Budget bill after the election.  If this occurs, it is unlikely that the Committee Comments, including the UAP language, will be carried over to an Omnibus Budget bill.  With an Omnibus Budget bill, negotiation authority typically shifts from the committee chairs to the party leadership.  Primary responsibility will sit with the Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and not remain with Acting Intelligence Chair Marco Rubio.  It is unlikely that this issue will have the same importance to the Senate Majority Leader who has many more priorities to juggle.     

[8] Arthur Lundahl set up the first CIA photo interpretive lab and supervised the expansion of photographic surveillance in the intelligence community for decades.  He is best known as the person President Kennedy relied upon for photo interpretation of Soviet missile sites during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

[9] i.e. https://vault.fbi.gov/UFO/UFO%20Part%2014%20of%2016/view  (Part 14 of 16).  The FBI records on this matter are mixed with other UFO-related issues from the time period. 

[10] If any Members of Congress are privy to information about an extraterrestrial presence, it would be the Gang of Eight, which is made up of the two party leaders in both houses and the Chair and Ranking Minority Member of the each Select Intelligence Committee.

[11] It is assumed, for the purposes of this discussion, that most of the Senators have no more knowledge about an ET presence than the average person on the street.  Most of that understanding will be shaped by Hollywood, not from intelligence briefings.  This process would not be taking place if the Senate Intelligence Committee had been fully briefed on the presence of extraterrestrial or interdimensional life on this planet.  There is precedent to measure the knowledge base about the phenomenon possessed by congressional representatives.  While it isn’t a perfect analogy, the 2013 Citizen Disclosure Hearings at the Washington D.C. Press Club gives us the best insight into the mindset of the elected officials who will receive the Report, assuming it is written.  Among the retired congressional participants in the Citizen Disclosure Hearing process, there was little knowledge of the issue before the hearings began.  Here, the Senators will not be hearing from UFO witnesses or outside expert opinions, they will be given information hand picked by those who have kept the secrets.  Any true education of our elected officials will have to come from credible outside sources like you.       

[12] The current U.S. Space Force website talks about space as a “warfighting domain” and plays up the militarization of space.  https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2223734/department-of-defense-releases-defense-space-strategy

[13] The name change from UFO to UAP is one indicator of concern by the military/intelligence community.  The last time the phenomenon had a name change was during the 1952 Wave when those trying to keep the phenomenon out of the public eye almost lost control.  The Pentagon used a name change from the “War Department” to the “Defense Department” to help its congressional funding requests.  Name changes affect the branding of a product, program, or other tangible item to help change people’s perception of it. 

[14] Any classification issues may end up on the President’s Resolute Desk.  The President has the inherent power to declassify data. 

[15] Currently, the Director of National Intelligence is a former member of congress who is viewed by many as having a highly partisan approach to national intelligence.  He is the first to hold that post who does not have the confidence of both sides of our partisan divide.  If there is a Presidential transition, there is no likelihood of cooperation between the outgoing administration and the incoming one this election cycle.  The new administration will start from scratch on this topic and many others.  This means delays in the filing of the Report with the four committees.

[16] This Memorandum, when discussing the politics that influence these issues, assumes that there will be a new President.  Even though polls normally tighten as election day approaches, the consistent polling of late shows a historic deficit that no incumbent has made up since modern polling began.  The part of the purpose of this memo is to give you an accurate picture of the landscape surrounding this issue.  As a public policy discussion, it cannot leave out the probable electoral outcome.  This assumption is based on my decades of work with political campaigns and election issues, not my political leanings.  It is also the latest consensus of the polling industry.   https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/bidens-polling-lead-is-big-and-steady/

Appendix

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Equitable Treatment of Relocation Costs for Intelligence Community Civilians

As demonstrated in The Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020, S. 3675, introduced by Senators Burr and Warner, the Committee strongly supports IC personnel who must make a permanent change of station to accept an IC position. The Committee recognizes such relocations pose significant financial hardships for the IC civilians who move their families to serve their country. Current law provides military members with exemptions from effective tax penalties for such relocations, but IC civilians have no similar exemptions, thus undermining the IC’s ability to recruit and maintain a highly qualified and motivated workforce. The Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020 would provide equitable tax treatment for IC civilians who are subject to similar permanent change of station orders. The Committee looks forward to expeditious congressional action  on  this matter.

Advanced Aerial Threats

The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive process within the Federal Government for collecting and analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other agencies as   the Director and Secretary jointly consider relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena (also known as ‘‘anomalous aerial vehicles’’), including observed airborne objects that have not been identified.

The Committee further directs the report to include:

  1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
  2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:
    1. geospatial intelligence;
    1. signals intelligence;
    1. human intelligence; and
    1. measurement and signals intelligence;
  3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted United States airspace;
  4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting for the Federal Govern- ment, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
  5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;
  6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to national security, and an assessment of whether this unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
  7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary may have achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put United States strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
  8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, and additional funding and other resources.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Form Letters to Congress.

Make your voice count.

To find your Congressional Representative: https://www.house.gov/representatives/find-your-representative

The Honorable (full name)
(room #) (name) House Office Building
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Re: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 3095 Committee Comments: Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon)


Dear Representative (last name):
On June 8, 2020, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee requested a Report from the defense and intelligence communities about policies for the coordination of the study of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon (“UAP”), formerly UFOs. Based on the tenor of the request’s language, the direction of the request is reasonable in the short-term but raises long-term concerns over the defense/intelligence driven assumptions of hostility.
In the Committee Comments, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee (“Committee”) stated that it “supports” the efforts of the Navy’s UAP Task Force to standardize UAP reporting, data collection, and analysis. This is a positive step to help us understand the UAP/UFO phenomenon. The Committee’s request is for a Report about the UAP/UFO phenomenon within 180 days of the adoption of the Intelligence Authorization Act.
The request of the Committee asks for a “threat assessment” from UAPs. The Report’s answer to this request will depend on what constitutes a threat. A genuine threat should be taken seriously. However, a vague response that the objects seen and photographed are from an “unknown” source and “may” be a threat should not be considered an adequate response. Congress must expect to receive detailed information about the source of these objects and specific examples of behavior that is considered threatening.
A demonstrated threat from an adversary would mean that another country has made a technological leap and should be viewed with concern. Yet, if the Report’s response cannot provide details of threatening actions and classified information of which country is the probable source of the phenomenon, other options should be explored in a more public setting. Despite the recent Naval photography showing objects that perform unusual maneuvers with no apparent power source, these incidents are not the only ones since World War II showing similar objects. If the Report does not contain specifics that give Congress some certainty of the source of these objects, Congress should expand its oversight to include possible non-terrestrial sources. These oversight efforts should be open to the public.
For over seventy years, similar objects have been reported with little or no oversight by Congress. In a free and open democracy, isn’t it time to allow Congress to set public policy about this real phenomenon with the participation of the American people?
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

The Honorable (full name)
(room #) (name) Senate Office Building
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Re: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 3095 Committee Comments: Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon)

Dear Senator (last name):
On June 8, 2020, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee requested a Report from the defense and intelligence communities about policies for the coordination of the study of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon (“UAP”), formerly UFOs. Based on the tenor of the request’s language, the direction of the request is reasonable in the short-term but raises long-term concerns over the defense/intelligence driven assumptions of hostility.
In the Committee Comments, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee (“Committee”) stated that it “supports” the efforts of the Navy’s UAP Task Force to standardize UAP reporting, data collection, and analysis. This is a positive step to help us understand the UAP/UFO phenomenon. The Committee’s request is for a Report about the UAP/UFO phenomenon within 180 days of the adoption of the Intelligence Authorization Act.
The request of the Committee asks for a “threat assessment” from UAPs. The Report’s answer to this request will depend on what constitutes a threat. A genuine threat should be taken seriously. However, a vague response that the objects seen and photographed are from an “unknown” source and “may” be a threat should not be considered an adequate response. Congress must expect to receive detailed information about the source of these objects and specific examples of behavior that is considered threatening.
A demonstrated threat from an adversary would mean that another country has made a technological leap and should be viewed with concern. Yet, if the Report’s response cannot provide details of threatening actions and classified information of which country is the probable source of the phenomenon, other options should be explored in a more public setting. Despite the recent Naval photography showing objects that perform unusual maneuvers with no apparent power source, these incidents are not the only ones since World War II showing similar objects. If the Report does not contain specifics that give Congress some certainty of the source of these objects, Congress should expand its oversight to include possible non-terrestrial sources. These oversight efforts should be open to the public.
For over seventy years, similar objects have been reported with little or no oversight by Congress. In a free and open democracy, isn’t it time to allow Congress to set public policy about this real phenomenon with the participation of the American people?
Thank you for your attention to this matter.