In Part Three, I recommended that revelatory hearings by Congress not be held up by an incomplete disclosure of UAP history. If definitive conclusions are reached by Congress about the nature, sources and purposes of UAP, Congress must start the process of public disclosure. Waiting until the history of UAP involvement by the military, IC and the defense industry is completely known to the appropriate committees will hold the disclosure process hostage to the forces that have kept these secrets away from the public’s elected representatives.
As discussed in Part Three, there may be many reasons for not receiving relevant information about the implications of UAP. Some are based upon past inefficiencies or just plain incompetence, but most reasons appear to have selfish motives. Since secrecy is protecting those who benefit, Congress should continue its investigation of the past to expose this waste, fraud and abuse while simultaneously informing the public about the conclusions that have been reached about UAP. Regardless of when these activities occurred, it is in the public interest to learn what lessons can be drawn to help guide future conduct.
Probably the most important lesson we can learn is finding the documentation that justified the actions taken, even if we have not yet determined the potential extent of illegal programs. Considering the declassified history, there is a high likelihood there are foundational documents that authorized decades of UAP-related operations. Learning the type of authorization that gave rise to secret UAP programs can teach us many things. It would initially show evidence of the officer who authorized the program.
Evidence in the declassified record points to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. After President Harry S. Truman authorized the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to investigate flying saucers in late 1952, the CIA Robertson Panel recommended government policies intended to marginalize UAP study. Simultaneously, the Air Force probably began hidden reverse-engineering programs. Prior to the formation of the Robertson Panel, a proposed White House National Security Council Directive was considered by the CIA to guide operations. However, no such directive has ever been publicly acknowledged. Since the intent of the “debunking” program was to be kept secret, any foundational authorizing documents would not be publicized.
If the policy direction was memorialized, it probably occurred in 1953. At the time, there was concern about a repeat of the 1952 saucer wave, particularly in the summer months. Several declassified memos circulated within the CIA raised concern of another saucer wave happening in the summer of 1953. After the January 1953 issuance of the Robertson Panel recommendations, policies would need to be developed to address a possible recurrence of the 1952 Saucer Wave, using the Panel Report as a baseline. Even though no saucer wave developed, the 1947 and 1952 waves demonstrate that the newly labeled unidentified flying objects (UFOs) were not going away. Hence, the need to formally establish or adjust classified policies to deal with the problem in a way that lowers interest in the phenomenon, thereby keeping it away from Congress. These policies could continue into new presidential administrations, possibly without their knowledge.
A 1953 policy directive would set the foundation for future activities of this multi-faceted clandestine operation. As originally recommended by the CIA, this policy guide would have to be issued by the Office of the President, probably the National Security Council. Any long term policies would need as much legal support without any congressional legislative foundation. The strongest legal UAP policy justification would be through legislation adopted by Congress. However, using legislation to establish long-term UAP policy would defeat the purpose of the effort. It would be very difficult to lower the interest in UFOs with a public introduction of the text of any proposed legislation.
The political uncertainty of bringing Congress into the mix would upend the plans to work on these issues as quietly as possible. Assuming that UAP artifacts were recovered at least as early as 1947, some emergency policies would have already been put in place before 1953. With the 1953 change in presidential administrations and new emphasis on sprawling national security executive authority, these policies would need to be updated for the long term. For instance, while the Truman Era UFO documents emphasize corroboration with academic institutions for defense research, the Eisenhower Administration shifted the research focus directly to private defense contractors. This change would require a new administrative infrastructure. One that would not rely upon congressional legislation as its foundation to keep matters clandestine. UFO research would be carried on with private contractors reporting directly to the CIA, Air Force, and later formed intelligence agencies. The Air Force and CIA would be free to oversee these programs while also taking steps to marginalize UFO interest as per the Robertson Panel guidance. Regardless of the earlier policies, the beginning of Eisenhower Administration is likely to be the time that policies were implemented to set a long term course of action, This would require detailed clandestine policy approvals to guide this new course of action. Secret policies would need to assure defense contractors that at least a colorable set of guiding policies were in place to protect their interests in this lucrative venture.
These factors make 1953 the most likely time that executive authorizations would be adopted to protect the interests of the defense contractors brought into the secret UAP process. While much work was done during this era “without a lot of high level paper pushing”, contract rights and intellectual property rights would need as high a level of protection that could be achieved without bringing Congress into the process. A presidential written authorization would be needed to provide colorable authority to act. These policies would have to be memorialized to provide as much protection as possible.
However, over time, any presidential UAP authorization might be weakened or eliminated by superseding congressional legislation. Since any presidential policy is superseded by overriding legislation, the validity of any 1953-era administrative authorizing document will be affected by subsequent legislation. The legislation does not have to be specific to the UAP subject matter. There are several areas of law that could limit or outright invalidate the provisions of these authorizing documents. Legislation will often contain a clause that finds that “notwithstanding any previous laws or regulations.” These new grants of legislative authority would supersede any contrary provisions in an Eisenhower UAP policy directive. At a minimum, the UAP laws, starting on December 27, 2021, contain provisions that require all UAP programs to be subject to new congressional authority. From this date forward, contrary provisions would be invalid with all UAP programs now subject to statutory control under 50 United States Code § 3373.
Considering the scope of the enabling UAP presidential directive, much earlier legislation could have already undermined any Eisenhower directive. Defense acquisition laws, intellectual property rights, budgetary requirements, environmental laws and many more provisions of any Eisenhower-adopted guidance could be inconsistent with post-1953 laws. If a newly enacted statute preempts the language of a 1953 presidential directive, the president or any executive department cannot just adopt a newer regulation to get around the impediment. The later adopted statute cannot be bypassed, except through the legislative process. There will need to be serious legal research to determine whether these 1953 authorizations will still provide any legal foundation for the activities undertaken under the Eisenhower directives.
In addition to the other efforts discussed in this series of blogs to get at the bottom of this man-made mystery, it will be important for a legal analysis of these myriad of issues. It is highly recommended that the Congress amend the UAP laws to add the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to the list of “appropriate” committees cleared to receive classified briefings. This would provide Congress with a hopefully bipartisan review over the foundations of any potential legal application of non-statutory 1953 authorizations for UAP study. As long as these additions do not stray from the overall bipartisan approach to the study of UAP, the Judiciary Committees could ask the questions that need to be asked. Working on a bipartisan basis, referrals could be made to the Justice Department to brings actions addressing waste, fraud and abuse that have been hiding behind these decades old authorizations. Challenging claimed patent rights; disgorgement of profits; barring the ability to contract with the federal government; recovery of materials from UAP; and potential disciplinary, civil or criminal penalties could be possible. The Justice Department, Inspector Generals, the Government Accountancy Office (GAO) or military tribunals could pursue these programs and personnel involved, based on referrals from the judiciary committees.
This issue could be the severest test for the mostly bipartisan approach to the phenomenon. The legality of patent rights, reverse UAP engineering funding methods, and possession of UAP artifacts will be called into question. Many of the players will be large defense contractors who have the financial wherewithal to protection their investments. The watering down of the Fiscal Year 2024 UAP legislation via lobbying efforts by defense contractors seeking to protect their investment has already occurred.
It is highly unlikely that AARO’s historical study of defense and intelligence involvement in the UAP mystery will address these issues. The ability of Congress to conduct this type of oversight may depend on the outcome of the 2024 federal election. The legality of the decades long hidden programs could be called into question depending on the success or failure of candidates or incumbents who are beholden to the defense industry. At a minimum, the recent UAP laws have attempted to bring an end to these secret programs. However, many of these programs, only having executive and not congressional authorizations may have become illegal decades ago. To the extent that these programs are or were legal may be one of the most serious obstacles to understanding UAP and whether our adherence to the rule of law has a UAP exception.
On March 11, 2024, I will post another blog. It will not be part of the Revelatory Disclosure Series. The next blog will discuss how this summer needs to become a UAP Summer. Similar to the concern of the CIA and Air Force that they were going to face another UFO Wave in the summer of 1953, the time has come to flip the page. With the upcoming federal election, now is the time to see where the candidates and political parties officially stand on continued study of UAP. The next blog will offer ideas for advocating that our political leaders take a stand. As the late Senator Harry Reid said when he wrote to me in 2020 personal correspondence, these are “vital issues.” They need to be addressed despite the oxen that may be gored.